As the ports play a prominent role in the national economy of the countries and a number of factors such as safety condition of the port and low rate or non-occurrence of accidents are greatly important for being selected as a destination for cargo owners to bring their vessels and cargo therein, giving due care to safety related issues in ports and harbors is among jurisdictional and sensitive duties of the authorities in ports and maritime areas. Enjoying some 3000 km of marine coastlines and more than 10 commercial ports throughout the country, Iran is no exception where its ports are responsible for cargo import and export. In this respect, container terminals are one of the high-risk areas in ports requiring extensive care of the pertaining authorities to take appropriate measures to maintain safety standard there. One of the significant methods and techniques for the risk assessment is P&HRAM as to the containers terminals. This method has been employed in this research taking into account the operation attributes of the works in ports and harbors. This method provided appropriate answers to the research questions in that it was predicted that the great part of the activities in container terminal poses a higher risk from human perspective than expected requiring some measures to be taken to mitigate the risks to a tolerable level. This research was conducted and the results demonstrated that more than 75% of the risks in container terminals are higher than acceptable level about which some measures were taken and the risks were reduced to 100% lower than tolerable level.
ports [1] [2] [3] . The high number and severity of the incidents in Bandar Shahid Rajaee port which is the largest container port of the country and the region are indicative of the fact that such factors as diversity of the tools and equipment, the frequency of the port workers, variety of the work systems, diversity of the import and export cargos, huge volume of cargo traffic and incoming and outgoing vehicles, different working hours, the number of the port terminal operators, the large scope of work have made the container terminal among the high-risk areas [3] [4] .
The safety is defined farness from the unacceptable level of risks [4] [5] . This means that the lower likelihood of danger, the lower possibility of risk which leads to safety.
The risk management is a systematic and logical process for the purpose of identification, analysis, assessment, control, information associated with any given activity and also striking an acceptable balance between the cost incurred by an incident and the cost associated with the precautionary measures to lower the risks [1] [4] [6] . Therefore, for the management of the risks in ports, firstly, the risk associated with the activities in the port should be established and then analyzed in a systematic process [7] .
Research Questions
• Are the risks identified in respect of manpower are tolerable [2] ?
• Are the intolerable risks identified are possible to be mitigated to a tolerable level by employment of the risk assessment methods and tools [2] ?
Research Objectives
The main objective of the research is the assessment of the risks associated with manpower in container terminals [3] .
Methodology and Data Collection
In this research library method was employed including the study of books, manuals, guidelines, dissertations, articles (domestic and international), websites and literature as well as the field study [3] [4] . Also in this research the statistics of the manpower incidents in SINA container terminal was used. In order to answer the research questions, a data collection tool was needed. In this research internet and incidents statistics were used as well.
Data collection method in this research is a field-basis one and other methods such as the study of literature, documents and the resources of related organizations were used as well [5] .
Data Analysis Method
In this research, the date has been collected using P&HRAM Risk Assessment method.
Following analysis of current situation of the container terminal and establishment of the operational procedures and the occupations being conducted by the manpower in the terminal, the risks will be identified and their assessment will be made. Given the findings of the information gained in this process, the risks will be valued in terms of frequency and severity [1] .
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Research Methodology
The risk assessment was carried out using Port and Harbor Risk Assessment Based on
In summary, the above methodology includes: • The methods which identifies the risks of the port activities
• Safety management system used controls the identified risks In the past, a safety management system on the basis of the incidents occurred and learning lessons from them was in place [8] . While, today, it is necessary to use the proactive risk assessment systems to manage the safety [8] . It, definitely, entails identification of the risks and their minimization in the safety management process [1] [9] [10] .
The safety is more important for the those companies and organizations operating in port and maritime fields due to material and spiritual losses arising from the incidents [1] [10] [11] . This method of risk assessment begins with identification of the risks including:
• Human resources • Environment • Assets (equipment, installations, tools and etc.)
• Port stakeholders When a risk is identified, its frequency and severity should be established as well. On this basis, a risk consists of:
• Frequency of occurrence • Consequence and its potential Actually, the likelihood of occurrence of incidents is a coefficient of its frequency and its severity and its consequence. In some cases, risks include a simple correlation between its severity and its likelihood of occurrence but in some other cases this correlation is more complex [1] [12] .
Taking the account of the above, the risks in the port and harbors is assessed using the Matrix 1 as shown in the Figure 3 .
This matrix is consisted of traceable and assessable cells. The above matrix is an example of the risk division diagram consisting of three sections:
1) Acceptable risks 2) Risks acceptable in particular circumstances 3) Intolerable risks When the risk matrix is developed containing the lines showing acceptable risks and put available to the user, then he/she he will understand that for what kinds of risk he/she should endeavor and make necessary planning. Upon recommendation of the risk mitigation solutions, the safety management may decide what recommendations are to be implemented for which necessary studies should be conducted as well [1] . The level of the acceptable risks is not established by the safety technicians or risk evaluators but it is to be determined by the safety management [1] [12] [13] .
Port and Harbor Risk Assessment Structure (P&HRAM)
Using this method, a compatible framework can be developed for the risk assessment and safety management system in ports because it is a proposed standard method for rectification of the current situation of the risk assessment in ports and harbors as shown in the Quantitative risk assessment entails updated values as well as quantitation of the consequences arising from the incidents. In safety management system, these consequences fall into four categories as shown in the Table 2 : 1) Human casualty, 2) Damage to asset (including: property, cargos, installations, equipment and vessels), 3) Environmental damages (particularly marine environment) and 4) Damage to stakeholders (adverse impacts of the incidents to the operation of a port negatively affecting the interest of the stakeholders) [1] . Prominent advantages of this categorization of incidents include giving a clear and understandable quantitative definition of incidents and risks in port areas and establishing the damages in quantitative and financial manner [1] [14].
Ultimately, definitions on different cases have been translated into figures to be used for the risk assessment by the port operators and local associations. These figures vary between 0 -10 as shown in the Table 3 [1] .
After quantification of the risk with a view to help safety officers to easily assess and classify risks, the types of the risks are categorized into 6 groups: 
The Findings of the Risk Assessment of the Current Operational Procedures in SINA Container Terminal
Following the risk assessment of the operational procedures of the SINA Container
Terminal in Shahid Rajaee Port (Bandar Abbas Port) [14] using P&HRAM and establishing the risks with assigning relevant figures, a number of appropriate recommendations were given as to how to cope with and minimize the identified risks. As shown in the Table 3 , frequency was multiplied by the severity of the risk and the result was assumed to the risk figure of each current operational process and the level of each was established using P&HRAM. The results are showing in the Table 4 .
Clarification on the Results of the Risk Assessment of the Current Operational Procedures in SINA Container Terminal, Bandar Abbas Port
The risk assessment in the container terminal shows that out of 35 operational procedures in the terminal some 26 procedures (75%) are higher than ALARP. This indicates that the operation in the terminal is high risk requiring control measures to lower the risk. After implementation of the recommended control measures, it was seen that the risk of all operational procedures (100%) lowered to tolerable level in a way that continuation of the activities in the terminal can take place without a particular problem.
On the basis of the results of the risk assessment in different stages, the procedures are showing in the Table 4: 1) Risk assessment of the ship operational procedures • Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 75% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
• Secondary risk assessment (R2): the risk of the 100% operational procedures proved to low and tolerable level.
2) Risk assessment of the berth operational procedures • Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 75% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
3) Risk assessment of the port areas operational procedures • Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 65% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level. 
The Findings of the Risk Assessment of the Operational Occupation in SINA Container Terminal
Terminal in Shahid Rajaee Port (Bandar Abbas Port) [14] using P&HRAM and establishing the risks with assigning relevant figures, a number of appropriate recommendations were given as to how to cope with and minimize the identified risks.
As shown in the Table 3 , frequency was multiplied by the severity of the risk and the result was assumed to the risk figure of each operational occupation process and the level of each was established using P&HRAM. The results are showing in the Table 5 . The risk assessment in the container terminal shows that out of 236 operational procedures in the terminal some 104 procedures (45%) are higher than ALARP and 122 procedures fall within the scope of ALARP. This indicates that the operation in the terminal is high risk requiring control measures to lower the risk. After implementation of the recommended control measures, it was seen that the risk of all operational declined more than 90% to tolerable level in a way that continuation of the activities in the terminal can take place without a particular problem. On the basis of the results of the risk assessment in different stages, the procedures will be as following: 1) Risk assessment of the ship operational procedures (80 operational occupations) • Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 37% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
• Secondary risk assessment (R2): the risk of the 97% operational procedures proved to low and tolerable level. 2) Risk assessment of the berth operational occupations (30 operational occupations) • Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 44% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
3) Risk assessment of the port areas operational occupations (76 operational occupations)
• Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 57% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
• Secondary risk assessment (R2): the risk of the 96% operational procedures proved to low and tolerable level. 4) Risk assessment of the port storage (warehousing)operational occupations (23 operational occupations)
• Initial risk assessment (R1): the risk of the 40% of operational procedures proved to be higher than ALARP level.
• Secondary risk assessment (R2): the risk of the 100% operational procedures proved to low and tolerable level. • Berth operation procedures: gantry cranes, equipment and machineries, awkward cargo, other equipment, weighting equipment.
Conclusions
• Yard operation procedures: reach stacker, vehicles moving around, spreader wires, equipment and machineries, dangerous goods containers, unsafe working condition and unfavorable weather condition.
• Storage/warehousing procedures: scale next to the warehouse, cargo train, vehicles moving around, rough ground, lift track, worn-out wires, inappropriate stowing of 
Comprehensive Safety Measures Recommendations
• Severity and frequency of an incident represent two helpful factors to establish the priority of the risks. Less frequent risks are more tolerable.
• The costs of risk mitigation of the old systems are greater and afford higher priority in terms of taking safety measures.
• If a risk cannot be removed in design stage, it should be minimized by different tools and options to a tolerable level.
• If a risk cannot be removed, it should be minimized using safety engineering. It is recommended that periodical inspections in respect of safety tools maintenance should be conducted.
• In case the safety control measures fail to mitigate the risk, necessary tools need to be employed to detect dangerous situations and warn the staff and workers against them.
• Management control methods such as development of guidelines and staff training should be used given the fact the human errors as the most important factor in occurrence of the incidents are more frequent than electronic technical failures.
• Some degree of risk should be accepted.
• Conducting the periodical assessment and complementary methods.
